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 Interagency Data exchange, Privacy protection and Governance 
Architecture for Information Sharing across Domains 
Abstract. This paper discusses privacy enhancing technologies in the 
field of inter-agency data sharing, a key government objective for effi-
cient public service delivery. We analyse the legal and conceptual 
framework that governs multi-agency cooperation in particular in the 
field of child protection work, and develop two approaches to represent 
relevant data protection ideas computationally in the infrastructure that 
agencies use to exchange sensitive personal data.  
Keywords: Information sharing, trust, governance 
1  Introduction  
1.1 Data sharing, data privacy and the UK e-governance agenda 
This paper describes a new approach to privacy protection by design in the field of 
inter-agency data exchange. Its aim is to assist the legitimate interest of state agencies 
to share data in cases such as multi-agency child protection work, while at the same 
time assuring both individual citizens and the agencies that hold their data that any 
sharing of it complies not just with the letter, but the spirit of data protection law. It 
grew out of interdisciplinary research facilitated by the Scottish Institute for Policing 
Research (SIPR) that brought together, lawyers, social- and computer scientists to 
work with data protection officers in police, social and health care services. We first 
introduce the guiding philosophy of our approach buy locating it in the wider socio-
legal discussion on privacy and public service delivery in the UK, looking in the in-
fluential conceptual analysis by Perri, Bellamy and Raab (henceforth PBR). From 
their analysis, we take two ideas in particular: that in designing IT infrastructure for 
privacy compliant data sharing in the public sector, it is helpful to distinguish hori-
zontal vs vertical integration. Horizontal data sharing policies, in the terminology of 
PBR, are those policies, laws and guidelines that regulate the tension between data 
sharing and privacy protection globally, across all services and applications. They are 
the most general and therefore abstract provisions that we encounter to determine if a 
specific data sharing event was law compliant. Vertical policies by contrast involve 
regulation and rules for very specific purposes, agencies and data sharing agreements. 
They tend to be as a consequence highly specific, technical and detailed. For Privacy 
Enhancing Technologies which in the spirit of Larry Lessig try to encapsulate legal 
provisions directly in code and making the law thus “self-enforcing”, horizontal and 
vertical policies pose very different challenges. Horizontal policies will be very ab-
stract, using as all high level legal provisions vague terms, policy statements and per-
mit considerable discretion in their application. For a formal rendition, this raises the 
*Manuscript (without Author's details)
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well-known and frequently discussed issue in AI and law of how to model open tex-
tured rules. (see e.g. Bench Capon 1993; Stranieri et al 1999) . Vertical rules will be 
highly specific, and therefore in constant need to be updated and revised as circum-
stances change. This raises the equally often discussed problem of consistency 
maintenance in legal AI in the face of rapidly changing laws (cf e.g. Bradley et al 
1991; Boer, Engers and Winkels 2010). PET approaches will have to take the differ-
ent type of legislation in horizontal and vertical settings into account, and idea repre-
sented in the structure of this paper. In the first part of the technical discussion, we 
show how we can model the balancing between privacy and data sharing require-
ments in a specific domain – multi-agency cooperation for law enforcement purposes. 
In the next part, we abstract from this a novel approach to a privacy enhancing data 
sharing framework globally, across the public sector, a horizontal approach in PBR’s 
terms. Another insight we take form PBR’s study is the important of “trust” if a non-
arbitrary “balancing “ between privacy and data sharing is to be achieved. This in our 
analysis applies not just to the relation between citizen and state, but also as trust 
relation between different state agencies, in particular agencies with widely differing 
professional cultures such as social services and police. Before we discuss the tech-
nical solutions however, we will situate the discussion more broadly in the socio-legal 
debate on surveillance, data sharing and privacy protection.  
1.2 Situating the data sharing, and data privacy debate in the UK  
In their seminal study on Data protection and information sharing in Britain, Perri, 
Bellamy and Raab (2004a and 2004b) analyse the difficulties in managing the tension 
between the increasing commitment of the UK government to interagency data shar-
ing, and the emerging, more privacy friendly legal framework driven by  the Human 
Rights Act and the European Data Protection Directive, implemented through the 
Data Protection Act. While their analysis focussed on policies by the Labour govern-
ment that was replaced by a conservative administration in 2010, the same policy 
trajectory has largely been maintained, even though the enthusiasm for very large and 
centralised IT projects in the delivery of data sharing has become more muted, with 
several high profile projects such as the national ID database for the time being aban-
doned (Schafer 2011).  
Perri, Bellamy and Raab identify four possible strategies for the governance to deal 
with the relation between data sharing and privacy. Governments, through a combina-
tion of legislation and IT infrastructure, could either  
a) seek to make the commitment to efficient public service delivery through data 
sharing and the commitment to privacy protection consistent; 
b) mitigate the tensions with safeguards such as detailed guidelines;  
c) allow privacy to take precedence over integration;  
d) allow data sharing to take precedence over privacy.  
The potential conflict between data sharing and privacy protection that these four 
strategies address exist in principle independently of developments in computer tech-
nology. However, as several commentators have noted, advances in ICT and the 
sometimes aggressive promotion of e-government by subsequent governments that 
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have committed themselves to a huge extension of online service provision have in-
creased the tension (Bellamy 1999, Beynon-Davis 2007). Data sharing is also a pre-
requisite to deliver key social policy programmes, in particular “holistic, multiagen-
cy” interventions that focus on small neighbourhoods or target specific  groups or 
even individuals (Perri Bellamy and Raab 2004a),  perceived to be either “at risk” 
(e.g. policies to combat school truancy) or “a risk” (fight against social ills ranging 
from anti-social behaviour by juveniles to terrorism). The risk management paradigm 
with its ever elusive promise of “safety” (Rauhofer 2008) and an actuarial approach to 
policy areas ranging from medical services to crime prevention further contributes to 
the enhanced reliance on big data for government decision making. These approaches 
require a high degree not just of data, but data of high quality and integrity, to give 
legitimacy to increasingly discriminating decision making in areas such as welfare 
entitlement, medical support or formal sanctions. To implement this agenda, a report 
from the Cabinet Office’s Performance and Innovation Unit (the PUI, as it then was) 
recommended a new legal framework that increased considerably the powers to share 
information about individual citizens across public service agencies.  This was sof-
tened by suggestions to develop new and better techniques and computing infrastruc-
ture for better privacy protection (PIU 2002). Even though the PIU report was not 
implemented in its original form, it illustrates, as PBR show, the possible tensions 
between data sharing and privacy in the field of public sector service delivery. The 
policy imperatives that make data sharing highly desirable, - risk assessment, data 
matching and social sorting techniques – are intrinsically linked with an increased 
capacity by the state for surveillance (Gandy 1993; 6 1998; Lyon 2003). At the same 
time, the high profile incorporation of the European Convention of Human Rights, 
whose Article 8 protects a right to privacy, and the increasing importance of European 
Union approach to Data Protection provided an environment where the government 
also committed itself publicly as a champion of individual liberty against state intru-
sion.  
PBR conclude that the government’s main strategy to resolve this tension has been so 
far b): more and more, and more and more detailed, rules, guidelines and regulation 
for highly specialised applications that try to mitigate the default position that data 
between government agencies ought to be shared. This makes data protection often 
cumbersome in practice, with businesses and state agencies complaining about a high 
administrative burden with little or no actual benefits for data subjects, and detri-
mental consequences for service delivery. (see e.g. Choudrie, , Vishanth and Jones 
2005) PBR’s assessment is consequently sceptical: This strategy is potentially unsta-
ble and possibly unsustainable. In particular, there is a very pressing concern that data 
sharing is taking precedence over privacy, with the specific legal safeguards ineffi-
cient or becoming irrelevant. While PBR thus give voice to the concerns of many 
academic analysis and privacy advocates, as noted above, the opposite picture is more 
frequently found in the public discourse in the UK. There, privacy laws are often 
portrayed as either a way “for criminals to get away with it”, hampering legitimate 
police efforts, or as an intrinsically undemocratic measure that protects councils and 
government agencies from public scrutiny by limiting transparency.  
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Despite these problems in the practice of e-governance, PBR also note that data shar-
ing and privacy need not necessarily be in conflict. This can be seen when comparing 
different government strategies in different sectors, with the balance between privacy 
and data sharing requirements differing markedly between applications and agencies, 
as does the perceived degree of conflict between the two. To support this claim, 
PBRs’s analysis stipulate two distinct, yet interdependent levels on which the result-
ing tension is managed. In what they call the horizontal dimension, a negotiated com-
promise is attempted at the level of general data protection law and the rules that gov-
ern data sharing practices across the public sector. Secondly, they identify as “vertical 
dimension” the attempts to “balance” the conflicting demands that are specific to 
particular fields of public policy and service delivery. As examples of vertical ap-
proaches to balance data sharing against privacy concerns, they analyse three different 
policy fields - Crime reduction and public protection; Data sharing and data matching 
to reduce welfare fraud; and Data sharing in the National Health Service. These case 
studies support their conclusions that: 
“public bodies are struggling to reconcile imperatives for data sharing with the 
principles of data privacy and that there is, as a result, an incipient tension be-
tween joined-up government and the right to privacy” (PBR 2004 b p.411) 
They also notice however that the case of the NHS differs markedly from the other 
examples, with the management of the tension becoming a focal point of its infor-
mation-governance regime. This has resulted in particular tight and demanding rules 
put in place to minimise the risk from data sharing. In the case of crime and public 
protection by contrast, and even more in the chase of fighting benefit fraud, the gov-
ernment allows data protection principle principles such as tight restrictions on use or  
avoidance of excessive collection, to take back seat behind the overriding imperative 
for joined-up working.  
In what follows, we will develop ideas for a privacy- preserving,  information-sharing 
infrastructure that takes PBRs analysis as their conceptual starting point, fleshed out 
however with empirical studies, both from the academic literature, our own work with 
key stakeholders in the quest for efficient inert-agency data sharing, and a question-
naire based study we conducted for a subgroup amongst these shareholders. The over-
all aim of our approach is to show how strategy1, co-existence between data protec-
tion and efficiency demands, desirable in theory but so far difficult to achieve in prac-
tice, can be facilitated through Privacy Enhancing Technology that embeds privacy 
concepts directly into the information sharing infrastructure, ensuring as a result data 
protection by design. The “glue” between the two concepts is the notion of trust: As 
PBR notice, the government has argued that good data protection makes a positive 
contribution to the level of trust between agencies, and also between agencies and 
their clients or customers. (PBR 2004a p216). This aligns with our own experience 
working with multi-agency stakeholders. Inherited, traditional distrust between differ-
ent government agencies can be a serious barrier to information sharing, having sound 
and robust data protection mechanisms in place can mitigate the hesitance to share 
data. This applies to situations where citizens are asked to supply data because they 
personally will benefit from better services (e.g. allowing different hospitals to access 
my health data so that I can chose the one best suited for my needs), but also to situa-
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tions where the gathering of data does not benefit any individual citizen, but serves 
communal interests, such as data sharing between police and education sector to min-
imise truancy.  
We will begin with a case study of data sharing in a specific domain, crime preven-
tion and control, focussing in particular of data sharing in multidisciplinary teams, 
involving e.g. police, social services, medical services and education providers. This 
cuts across two of PBRs case studies, though they briefly mention child protection 
work under the crime and disorder header. However, it should be noted that the in-
volvement of medical care providers at a central point in detecting child abuse means 
that this issue can’t be separated from the treatment of data in the NHS environment, 
a n environment that PBR did not only analyse separately, but which according to 
them has significant differences in the way in which it mediates between data sharing 
and privacy objectives, finding a framework that allows privacy compliant data shar-
ing between police and medical professionals is therefore a particularly difficult task. 
is not only separate, but also Starting with a “vertical”, domain specific example of 
managing the tension between privacy and data sharing follows PBRs conclusion that  
“insofar as formal rules and norms are emerging to manage the tensions, the 
most important rules and norms are specified vertically, in the policy fields. By 
contrast, the horizontal policy initiatives, both in data protection law and in 
cross-cutting data-sharing policy, have limited capacity either to constrain or to 
direct policy and practice.” 
In the final part, we will however generalise these ideas to a platform for data sharing 
independently of domains. The framework we use for this has been tested in a hospi-
tal environment – if it can serve as a blueprint, then following the discussion above, 
the sector with the most stringent data protection requirements would determine the 
architecture for data sharing in general.  
1.3 Vertical data sharing policies: Data sharing and privacy protection in 
multi-agency crime prevention  
In 2005, the 17 month old Peter Connolly, known in the press as “Baby P” died from 
more than 50 injuries that he suffered over an eight-month period on the hands of his 
mother and her boyfriend. It quickly transpired that he had been seen frequently by 
Haringey Children's services and NHS health professionals, who had failed however 
to coordinate their various reports and as a result spot the danger he was in. His was 
but the last I a number of high profile cases of child neglect and child abuse where 
victim and perpetrator had been known to several agencies, from social services to 
hospitals to police, but where due to a lack of data sharing between them, appropriate 
reaction had not been taken.  
At the same time however, the opposite problem also grabbed headlines: Local coun-
cils were caught abusing legislation intended to combat terrorism to collect and ex-
change data of citizens suspected of everything from permitting their dog to foul in 
parks to lying about their address in applications to schools for their children.  
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When in the first type of cases, harm ensued because data that should, and legally 
could have been exchanged between agencies wasn’t, in the second type of cases data 
that should never have been collected in the first place was exchanged without care 
and precaution between agencies. In theory, a whole raft of legal measures, from the 
Data Protection Act to the Community Care Act 2003 should have ensured that all 
and only the necessary and legally permissible data is exchanged. However, regulat-
ing data exchange between agencies through legal codes has proven difficult. “Top 
Level” acts such as the Data Protection Act use highly abstract language, give only 
vague guidance on how to balance competing interests, and are too unspecific to be of 
direct help to personnel that is not legally trained. Inter-agency Information Sharing 
Agreements that try to operationalise the relevant law have by now become so com-
plex, long and technical in their attempt to cover every possible situation that they are 
often ignored by practitioners working under sever time constraints. Technological 
solutions have not fared better. The UK government invested heavily in “one big 
database” schemes that obligates agencies to store their information centrally. If all 
the data is in one place, in a uniform format and accessible to everybody who needs to 
know, so the reasoning, information exchange must improve. Yet the results of these 
schemes is disappointing so far – not just because they are overly expensive, but be-
cause they are faced with a grassroots boycott by users. If the users are forced to rec-
ord data in ways that are not aligned with their own understanding of their role, and if 
they furthermore have to fear to lose “ownership” over the data that is stored outside 
their control, uptake of the technology will be limited. The result is that decisions 
about data sharing are often done informally, between individuals that trust each other 
on a personal level, and with insufficient transparency and audit possibilities. Personal 
attitudes and professional mentalities, rather than legal rules, decide if agencies “play 
it safe” by not disclosing important information (fearing actions under the DPA), or 
disclosing unnecessarily (in fear of being caught “doing nothing”). 
The exchange of information between the police and community partners forms a 
central aspect of effective community service provision. In the context of policing, a 
robust and timely communications mechanism is required between police agencies 
and community partner domains, including: Primary healthcare (such as a Family 
Physician or a General Practitioner); Secondary healthcare (such as hospitals); Social 
Services; Education; and Fire and Rescue services.  
Such requests typically form the basis for any information-sharing agreement that can 
exist between the police forces and their community partners. It defines a role-based 
architecture, with partner domains, with a syntax for the effective and efficient infor-
mation sharing, using SPoC (Single Point-of-Contact) agents to control information 
exchange. The application of policy definitions using rules within these SPoCs is 
inspired by network firewall rules and thus defines information exchange permissions. 
These rules can be implemented by software filtering agents that act as information 
gateways between partner domains. Roles are exposed from each domain to give the 
rights to exchange information as defined within the policy definition. This work 
involves collaboration with the Scottish Police, as part of the Scottish Institute for 
Policing Research (SIPR), and aims to improve the safety of individuals by reducing 
risks to the community using enhanced information-sharing mechanisms. Agencies 
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are actively encouraged by governments (Police and Crime Standards Directorate 
2007) to form partnerships and collaborate to ensure provision of effective communi-
ty services. Working in partnership by sharing information has been particularly suc-
cessful in public services (Clarence and Painter 1998). Often, partnership working is a 
requirement mandated by legal directives. In the UK, for example, Acts of Parliament 
such as the Health and Social Care Act 2001, Police Reform Act 2002, Community 
Care Act 2003 and the Children Act 2004 all necessitate information sharing among 
partner agencies.  
Barriers to forming effective partnerships and information exchange include lack of 
trust between organisations; lack of understanding of policies and legislation; and 
disparate communication systems. The issue of trust can arise from traditional rival-
ries between organisations that view each other as competitors rather than collabora-
tors (Hudson et al 1999). Our research however indicates a more pertinent problem 
caused by incongruent professional values and missions of the different stakeholders. 
A social worker, trying to establish a trust relation with a young person deemed at risk 
will be hesitant to pass on information about low level drug dealing to the police, if he 
fears that the information will result in heavy handed police activity that would make 
his work impossible (Willem and Buelens 2007). However, evidence suggests that 
increased government encouragement to collaborate (Richardson and Asthana 2006), 
in the form of incentives and legal obligations, has helped in alleviating this situation. 
Initiatives that highlight best practices and procedures, such as the guidance on the 
Management of Police Information (MoPI) within the Scottish and other UK police 
services, also simplify the interpretation of policies and legal requirements. This ease 
of interpretation of policies, in turn, alleviates the risks agencies face from non-
compliance and, thus, further aids collaboration. 
1.4 Data sharing model 
In modern democracies, rightly suspicious of the danger that information can also be 
abused, data sharing has to take place within tightly defined legal parameters, found 
in legislation such as the Data Protection Act (1998) in the UK. Put simply, it is more 
acceptable to invade the privacy of a person under reasonable suspicion to plan a 
terrorist attack than that of a mother  suspected, with little evidence, to have lied about 
her address on the application for a school place. As a first step to model the legally 
required balancing, we developed four categories of data sharing scenarios that can be 
found in police work. On each level, different arguments count for or against sharing 
of data, and the legal analysis differs accordingly: 
 Level 1. Community. This level focuses on community actions, typically using 
Intelligence Lead Policing, where measures are taken to try and prevent future 
criminal activities. A typical example is a decision to increase patrols in an area 
where intelligence indicates that gang activity could otherwise rise.  
 Level 2. Preventative intervention. This level focuses on prevention of specific, 
identified criminal activities, with the requirement to share information often de-
pending on the anticipated harm. A typical example is rescuing a kidnap victim. 
8 
 
 Level 3. Crime investigation. This level deals with the investigation of a specif-
ic crime. Unlike level 2, which is forward looking, level 3 is backwards looking, 
a singular past event is the focus, the main harm has already occurred.  
 Level 4. After the event. This level focuses on consuming data on criminal ac-
tivity, in order that it can be used in the future to reduce the risk to the public. 
This involves for instance the compilation of statistics by police agencies. It feeds 
back into level 1, and also informs activities such as resource allocation by the 
police.  
The justification to share information at Level 2 and 3 can be achieved through an 
information sharing agreement. One key feature of our approach is the ability to for-
mally define the relevant criminal contexts explicitly. For example in a missing per-
son context, a social worker may request the current location of the person from the 
police, and justify it in this context. When audited, the social worker would then have 
to provide evidence that the context was correct at the time of the query. A rule can 
thus be written which defines the context, and the requirements for the information 
sharing, which is then agreed between the police and the community partner. The 
information sharing agreement (ISA) at this level can thus define a criminal context. 
At Level 1 and Level 4, it is more difficult to define clearly a criminal context, as 
there is no actual crime. In this paper we focus therefore on Levels 2 and 3, as the 
criminal context is easier to define in an ISA.  
2 Information Sharing Framework 
As discussed in our analyses of PBR, highly specific and local data protection rules 
and guidelines are typical for vertical data sharing and data protection management. . 
As a result, the syntax proposed in this part of the paper mirrors principles of best 
practice within the Scottish Police, such as those highlighted in the guidance on the 
Management of Police Information (MoPI). They are a typical example of what PBR 
described as “vertical” rules that manage their tension between privacy and data shar-
ing. These guidance principles for police information management in turn are loosely 
inspired by concepts such as “firewall” and “single point of contact” that are attuned 
to computational thinking.  
Once the need to share information with a partner agency is identified and affected 
procedures and compliance issues defined, the principles highlighted in MoPI can be 
used to construct an Information-Sharing Agreement (ISA). ISA’s define the agreed 
specific rules, derived from policies, that direct the recording, access, review and 
dissemination of information between partner agencies. Usually, agencies that have 
similar functions also have similar ISAs and can be grouped together into domains. 
From a Scottish policing perspective, common information sharing domains include 
Police services (POL), Social Services (SOC), Primary healthcare (HCP), Secondary 
healthcare (HCS), Education (EDU), and Fire and Rescue (FIRE). MoPI also outlines 
the concept of a Single Point-of-Contact (SPoC), which describes the individuals who 
are designated as main contacts for the exchange of information between domains. 
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Any exchange of information between the domains, therefore, needs to occur through 
the designated SPoCs. 
2.1 Single Point of Control (SPoCs) 
Figure 1 illustrates the Single Point of Contact (SPoC) concept described in the guid-
ance on the Management of Police Information (MoPI), which is implemented as 
software agents that serve as gateways for information requests. The function of these 
SPoC agents is inspired by firewalls within a computer network. At a basic level, 
firewalls use a defined set of rules to either permit or deny network traffic. Similarly, 
SPoC agents validate requests for information exchange based on rules, derived from 
organisational policies and legislative requirements, as defined in Information-
Sharing Agreements (ISA). This means that the agent attempts to match a request for 
information exchange against the rules defined in the set of rules in the ISA. If the 
request does not match a rule, the agent will then attempt to match the request against 
the next rule and so on. Once a match is found, the agent will carry out the action 
(permit or deny), as defined by that rule, and end the searching (as a firewall would). 
If no matching rule is found in the set, the agent will deny the request. This is similar 
to the idea of an implicit deny criterion used by firewalls where no matching rule is 
found. In the case that a request is denied, the agent will return information indicating 
the reason for the denial. The policies defined in the ISA can take the form of re-
strictions such as limits on the number of search items returned, specified timeframe 
of validity for an incoming request, and so on. An agent based approach has the bene-
fit that each partner remains owner of their data and decides its formats, a key re-
quirement to ensure acceptance of the approach and maintenance of trust. Just as in 
the offline world, a police officer would have to contact his counterpart in another 
agency, which then determines internally what information to release, the software 
agents are in constant negotiation with each other for access. This maintains the intui-
tive concept of ownership of data, and auditable exchange relations. It also permits, 
through a federated Identity Management System, the protection of the identity of the 
source of information where this is desirable. We mentioned above the case of a so-
cial worker who has information that in principle is relevant for the police, but would 
force him to put his sources in jeopardy. This approach here permits a nuanced re-
sponse to an information request, with strong protection of identity build into the 
system. This too we see as a necessary design feature to increase trust through archi-
tecture.   
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Figure 1: Overview of the architecture 
2.2 Role-Based System 
A core part of the Information-Sharing Agreement (ISA) is to specify those who will 
have access to the information. Typically, this involves identifying functional roles 
that need to access information in order to complete a defined task or job. The infor-
mation exchange syntax thus uses a hierarchy within domains and roles exposed be-
tween domains to facilitate the exchange of information. For example, Analyst (ANA) 
may be an exposed role from the Child Abuse Investigation (CAI) organisational unit 
in the Police domain (POL). This role is represented as POL.CAI.ANA, illustrating 
the full hierarchy. Similarly, an Inspector (INS) from the Missing Persons (MPR) 
business area of the Police domain would then be represented as POL.MPR.INS. For 
a Social Worker (SW) role exposed from the Children Day Care Service (CDC) of the 
Social Services (SOC) domain, the representation would be SOC.CDC.SW. Essential-
ly an exposed role is one that has permissions for information exchange from another 
domain. For example, if Social Workers (SOC.CDC.SW) are allowed to request in-
formation from Police (POL), then the SOC.CDC.SW role would be defined in the 
ISA as having permissions for this action. Thus, the SOC.CDC.SW role is exposed 
from the Social Services domain to the Police domain. Crucially again, the definition 
of these roles happens through each community partner, and is not dictated from the 
top. This means that traditionally highly hierarchical organizations such as the police 
can nonetheless efficiently interact with much flatter hierarchies found in social ser-
vices, without either having to compromise their self-understanding and way of doing 
things.   
2.3 Syntax 
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A syntactic approach to the concept of information-exchange simplifies the creation 
and implementation of rules. The main reason for this approach is the vast number of 
disparate information systems that various police divisions and partner agencies use, 
and which this approach preserves. The danger is that valuable semantics can be lost 
in the exchange, which degrades the efficiency of the information-sharing mecha-
nism. By agreeing not to harmonize the way data is stored, but the way information 
requests are handled, we try to minimize the dangers while retaining the benefits of a 
decentralized approach. Common logical definitions, which constrain possible inter-
pretations of any given concept to a finite set, therefore, need to be agreed upon be-
fore communication can occur 
Adding key security elements to this structure yields the proposed syntax for policy 
rules which are applied into the SPoC: 
[permit | deny] [Requester] requests [Attribute] of [Object] with [Context] from 
[Owner] for [N] records in [TimeWindow] using [Compliance] 
A similar matching syntax can then be applied to the request messages: 
[Requester] requests [Attribute] of [Object] with [Context] from [Owner] with-
in [Start] to [End] 
For our purpose relevant elements of this syntax are defined as: 
 [permit | deny] This part of the rule syntax indicates the action of the rule and 
defines whether a message meeting the rule criteria will be permitted or denied. 
 Requester This identifies an exposed role defined in the ISA. For example, this 
role might be General Practitioner (FAMDOC) in Primary healthcare (HCP) or a 
Detective Constable (DETCST) in Police services (POL) domain.  
 Object. This refers to any entity about which information is held, including peo-
ple, vehicles, events and so on. It is a freeform field.  
 Attribute. This is a unit of information describing an Object. Attributes may 
include details about location (address, mobile phone tracking), identity (name, 
insurance number), history (prior convictions, documented allegations), behav-
iour (calm, violent) and association (group memberships, known associates).  
 Context. This identifies the reason why the information is being shared. The 
context also governs the level of access and permissions associated with infor-
mation exchange and, hence, affects the priority accorded to information re-
quests. For example, the Emergency context signifies a threat to life or threat of 
violence and will require a higher priority allocation than a Vandalism context. 
 Owner. Defines a role with sufficient privileges to manage all aspects of an in-
formation element. The owner has the authority to allow or deny access to an in-
formation element, as required by legislation and defined responsibilities. Use of 
the term owner in this context implies custodianship.  
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  [Compliance] This is part of the rule syntax that refers to policies and legislative 
requirements that affect the exchange of information. Such as the Data Protection 
Act, the Human Rights Act, the Freedom of Information Act, and so on. 
2.4 Context 
A key novelty in the proposed system is the use of context for a request, where the 
ISA will define rights based on the context of the request. For example the rights to 
data will be higher within the context of a missing persons query than for a trivial 
access to data. It is thus important that the context levels, and associated rights, are 
clearly defined in the ISA. For our approach, we developed a conceptual hierarchy 
loosely based on the categories found in the codified, and hence highly conceptual, 
German Criminal law. In addition, we use as a proxy to weight severity within a cate-
gory (e.g. murder vs manslaughter as “offences against the person”) the minimum 
punishment that the crime carries (Francis, Soothill, and Dittrich 2001), supplemented 
by a large questionnaire based study that asked members of relevant agencies to rate 
their own perception of the seriousness of certain offences, and what privacy risk they 
think is acceptable to either prevent or prosecute such an offence (for details of this 
study see Uthmani et all 2011)  In the next step, socio-legal literature together with 
our own studies is used to lay an empirical foundation for the metrics the system is 
using. This additional measure will help us to model one of the main problems in 
interagency collaboration, diverging value systems that shape professional cultures.  
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Figure 2: Context definition 
2.5 Example 
Rules may be used to explicitly permit or deny information exchange requests made 
by an exposed role. For example, a Senior Family Physician (Requester 
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role=FAMDOCSEN) in Primary healthcare (Requester domain=HCP) is allowed to 
request a person’s medical test results (attribute=MEDTST), from a Laboratory 
(Owner organisational Sub-unit=LAB) located in a Hospital (Owner organisational 
unit=HOSP) in Secondary healthcare (Owner domain=HCS), where the person (Ob-
ject=PERSON) is a patient (Context=PATIENT). A Junior Family Physician 
(FAMDOCJUN) role from the same domain is not allowed to request this infor-
mation. These information exchange policies can be used to derive an explicit permit 
rule (Rule 1) for the FAMDOCSEN role and an explicit deny rule (Rule 2) for the 
FAMDOCJUN role. These rules would be defined in the Information-Sharing 
Agreement (ISA) and processed by the SPoC agent (where [PERSON] will be the 
free-form search field): 
Rule 1:  [permit] [HCP.FAMDOCSEN] requests [MEDTST] of [PERSON] with 
[PATIENT] from [HCS.HOSP.LAB] for [N] records in [TimeWindow] using 
[Compliance] 
Rule 2:  [deny] [HCP.FAMDOCJUN] requests [MEDTST] of [PERSON] with 
[PATIENT] from [HCS.HOSP.LAB] for [N] records in [TimeWindow] using 
[Compliance] 
Given the above rules, the following requests may be considered: 
Req. 1:  [HCP.FAMDOCSEN] requests [MEDTST] of [PERSON] with 
[PATIENT] from [HCS.HOSP.LAB] within [Start] to [End] 
Req. 2:  [HCP.FAMDOCJUN] requests [MEDTST] of [PERSON] with 
[PATIENT] from [HCS.HOSP.LAB] within [Start] to [End] 
Thus, a request made by a Senior Family Physician (Request 1) would match Rule 1 
and be permitted by the SPoC agent. A similar request made by a Junior Family Phy-
sician (Request 2) would match Rule 2 and be denied by the SPoC. In the case of 
Request 2, the SPoC may return the following message: 
Junior Family Physician role does not have permission to access the requested 
resource. 
The context of a request for information exchange affects how the request is handled. 
For example, a Detective Constable (Requester role=DETCST) in the Domestic Vio-
lence (Requester organisational unit=DOM) area in Police services (Requester do-
main=POL) is allowed to request a person’s (Object=PERSON) behaviour infor-
mation (Attribute= BEHAVIOUR) from the Rehabilitation Support organisation 
(Owner organisational unit=REHAB) in Social Services (Owner domain=SOC), if 
this is in relation to a domestic violence investigation (Context=DOM.INVST). This 
following rule may be derived from this policy: 
Rule 3: [permit] [POL.DOM.DETCST] requests [BEHAVIOUR] of [PERSON] 
with [DOM.INVST] from [SOC.REHAB] for [N] records in [TimeWindow] us-
ing [Compliance] 
Thus, the following request, Request 3, made by a Detective Constable would match 
Rule 3 and be permitted by the SPoC: 
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Request 3: [POL.DOM.DETCST] requests [BEHAVIOUR] of [PERSON] with 
[DOM.INVST] from [SOC.REHAB] within [Start] to [End] 
However, if the Detective Constable requested this information in relation to a vehicle 
parking offence (Context=VPO), as in Request 4, the request would not match a de-
fined rule and be denied by the SPoC. 
Request 4: [POL.DOM.DETCST] requests [BEHAVIOUR] of [PERSON] with 
[VPO] from [SOC.REHAB] within [Start] to [End] 
In this case, the SPoC may return the following message: 
Vehicle Parking Offence is not a defined role in Information-Sharing Agreement. 
3 Horizontal management of data protection and data sharing 
requirements 
In the example discussed above, highly domain specific rules on data protection and 
data sharing were modelled together with information sharing agreements between 
individual agencies. Our claim is that the data protection aspect that is in this way 
hardwired into the information exchange protocols is not, as so often perceived to be, 
a hindrance to efficient police work. Rather, it is essential to allow offline trust rela-
tions between individuals in the various agencies to be replicated as “trust in the sys-
tem” online. Different agencies do not lose ownership of the data that they have col-
lected for their own purposes – in line with the data protection principle of purpose 
roundedness of data collection. Nor are they required to abide by a centrally imposed 
conceptualisation of their work. Rather, the negotiated settlements preserve the 
unique understanding of the various agencies, and can give them confidence that any 
information sharing that the system permits also aligns to their own understanding of 
the relevant data protection law. Medical workers, whose work is driven by a care 
ethos, can therefore more confidentially share information with police requesters 
without having to fear that the police’s very different approach to data protection 
issues - as noted by PBR – overrides their own understanding of the relation they have 
with their patients.  
Rules can be quickly updated as changes in the information sharing agreements, or 
changes in the covering legislation occur. However, this also means that a considera-
ble degree of domain specific coding of legal rules has to take place. This raises 
amongst other questions the issue of this approach is scalable. We therefore continue 
our discussion of privacy enhancing technologies and inter agency sharing by looking 
at a more abstract approach to the problem that nonetheless preserves significant fea-
tures of the system described above, and remains true to its empirical and motivation-
al underpinning. In the terminology of PBR, the resulting system allows a global, or 
horizontal, management of the conflict between data protection and data sharing re-
quirements  
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This part of the paper outlines the safi.re (Structured Analysis, Filtering and Integrat-
ed Rules Engine) framework
1
 which creates a formal structure for the abstraction, 
governance and implementation of trust relationships and security policies. Trust and 
security become the more abstract, and explicitly defined, counterparts of what we 
saw above in terms of highly domain specific firewall rules. Once these have generat-
ed a trust relation between the parties that is based in the knowledge that any data 
sharing between them will abide by mutually acceptable rules, we can forget the con-
tent of these rules (which run in the background) and focus instead on ensuring that 
only trusted parties can access the information.  It can be used as a full end-to-end 
solution for policy abstraction, implementation and controlled access to services, or 
can integrate each of the elements as a Service to existing applications. 
The safi.re architecture has been used in a number of projects including with health 
and social care, including with the TSB-funded DACAR project with Chelsea and 
Westminster Hospital in London which focused on creating an e-Health Cloud within 
a hospital environment (Fan et al 2007). This used a novel method of defining the 
ownership of the data, and providing rights infrastructure for the citizen (or patient) to 
define the rights of access to their data. This work has since been extended within a 
number of projects including the TSB Trusted Service project, which has focused on 
integrating both digital and human trust, to provide a fully integrated and holistic care 
infrastructure, which integrates primary and secondary health care with assisted living 
while preserving patient privacy. (Fan et al 2012; Ekonomou et al 2011; Lo et al 
2012).  
As discussed in the previous section, another important area for information sharing is 
within the holistic care, where information from different public sector agencies can 
be used to improve the care of citizens. This might relate to sharing information on a 
child for concerns posted within health, social care, education and policing, where 
concerns within just one of these domains would not be seen as a major concern, but 
when aggregated across several of these, it might result in the concerns being escalat-
ed to the point where an action plan is initiated. The work has thus evolved into pro-
jects which involve information sharing for Child Protection, which involve the in-
creasingly typical a multi-agency approach (see e,g, Blyth 1990; Reder and Duncan 
2003). As there is information held within each of the public sector agencies, it is 
important that accesses are well managed and controlled for the rights for the access 
to data. 
3.1 Key questions within a trust framework and terms 
A simple abstraction of access is that an accessor from a specific domain accesses a 
service within another domain. This access can be in terms of their identity and/or 
role, and which might involve some form of relationship to the subject of the access. 
For example a GP might access the health record of one of the patients, where they 
                                                          
1
 http://safi.re 
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have the role of being the actual GP of the patient, given them higher access rights 
than if they were just a GP. 
Overall the key questions in the design of a trust framework include: 
 How is the infrastructure segmented into domains, and what is the structure 
of these domains? A key part of the safi.re architecture is that small sub-domains 
can exist within a larger domain definition. This allows for micro-policies to be de-
fined within the larger domains, and for macro-ones to exist for the connection be-
tween domains. 
 Who is trusted within the infrastructure, and how do they map to the defined 
domains? 
 Who are the data owners of the core data, and who will be trusted to govern 
this data? 
 What services do these domains offer, and what is the formal definition of the 
services? 
 How are users identified and what attributes they need to consume a service from 
another domain? 
 How do we handle delegation, consent, and relationship, where the accessor is 
accessing information related to a subject, and has some connection to them? 
 How are anonimization and sanatization dealt with across cross-domain ac-
cess? 
 How do we wrap the data access up into well-managed service access points? 
3.2 Safi.re Architecture 
In modern service-oriented infrastructures a user must gather claims to consume a 
service. Too often the service is bound to a specific authentication infrastructure 
which limits the scalability of the provision of the service. For more dynamic infra-
structures there is no direct communication between the service and the gathering of 
the claims around identity and the attributes required to consume a service, . It is the 
focus of the Trust and Governance infrastructure to define a contract which binds 
these terms of service together. This contract pre-defines the requirements for the 
claims to the service, and then is trusted to actually issue the contract for the user to 
consume the service. The Safi.re architecture abstracts the trust relations from well-
defined policies. A trusted broker will then pass the requirements for a user to con-
sume a service, and the Trust Framework will provide back the claims that are re-
quired to be able to consume the service. The user will then gather the claims, and the 
broker then passes these to the Governance Engine for it to check its running rules for 
rights to the service. If these are acceptable it will issue a service token to consume 
the service, which can be given back to the user, via the broker (or the service can be 
invoked on their behalf, and the link to the service can be returned to the user).  
As with our approach outlined in 3 above, a key element of the Trust Framework is 
the concept of role, relationship, consent and delegation, where an role can claim 
rights of access to a referrer. In this way the owner of the data can have rights of ac-
cess based on their role (such as whether they are a GP), their relationship (such as 
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whether they are the GP of a specific patient), their consent (whether someone has 
given them rights), or their delegation (where they have given delegation of authority 
to another person). 
3.3 Trust and Governance as a Service (TaaS and GaaS) 
With the complex relationships that organisations have in rights of access to services, 
it is becoming increasingly more important to abstract and fully define the trust and 
the levels of access to services. Safi.re thus provides the ability to extract the trust 
relationship between two domains, and then implement this as a set of rules. These 
are thus defined in the Trust Framework and the Governance Engine, which can be 
easily integrated into existing applications. Figure 3 outlines a basic use case, where a 
broker deals with the requests form a user. It will then use the Trust Framework to 
define the requirements of the claim to a service, and the Governance Engine to check 
these rights against the actual rules of access to a service. Dynamic trust relationships 
can be built up for identity and attribute providers, and how these map to the role, 
relationship, consent or delegation that an individual has to consume a service. The 
service itself can be involved by the broker or a service token can be sent back to the 
user for them to give to the service. In this way both legacy services and new trusted 
services can be integrated into the infrastructure. 
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Figure 3:  Trust and Governance as a Service 
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3.4 Safi.re Gateway Engine  
Safi.re can also implement a filtering gateway which takes the rules from the Govern-
ance Engine, and runs them with a Gateway Engine, which then directly runs the 
rules, in a similar way that a network firewall will implement the filtering of network 
packets. Figure 4 outlines the full integration where the abstraction of the trust rela-
tionships, then created the rules, which are then implemented within a gateway, which 
will control access to the services based on the trust relationships. This type of archi-
tecture fully implements an end-to-end solution for trust relationships, where the re-
quirements can be audited and reviewed, with control of each stage. It also can inte-
grate with a wide range of stakeholders, using trusted identity infrastructures. 
 
Domain A
Referrer ID
Governance 
Rules
Trust 
Framework
Policy
Definition
IDP
AtrP
Trusted IDP/Atrp
Domain B
SPoC
(Gateway)
Access ID
Service
(RP)
Referrer ID
Access ID
Trusted
Broker
Governance 
Engine
Trust 
Framework
Relationship, 
Consent,
Delegation
3. Service 
Requirements
4. Claims 
Requirement
8. Claims
9. Rights
10. Service Invoke [ID,Items]
1. Service Access
5. Claim 
Requirements
IDP
AtrP
Trusted IDP/Atrp
6. Claims 
collection
7. Claims
2. Access ID 
Database
Relationship, 
Consent,
Delegation Services
Domain Ontology
Service Definition
 
Figure 4:  Full integration 
3.5 Novel Binary Decision Diagrams for Modelling 
What we need in addition to the formalism described above in 3 is the integration of a 
formal trust framework and implemented rules, and then modelling of complex trust 
relationship between domains using a patent pending method of Binary Decision Dia-
grams (BDDs).
2
 BDDs are rooted, directed, acyclic graphs originally proposed by Lee 
(1959) and Akers (1978) in 1978 to graphically represent Boolean functions. BDDs 
originate from binary decision trees which are rooted, directed trees that can be used 
                                                          
2
 US Patent Application No 13/739074 
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to represent Boolean functions. For example, the decision tree illustrated in Figure 5 
represents the Boolean function f(x; y) = (x ∨ y). 
The concept behind this form of representation is that each non-terminal node (circle) 
in the decision tree denotes a variable. In the example illustrated in Figure 6, the vari-
ables are x and y. The node refers to a test of the variable’s binary value, 0 or 1, with 
the edges of the node representing the paths taken by either possible value. The path 
represented by the dashed (low) edge corresponds to the case where the variable is 
assigned a 0, and the path represented by the solid (high) edge corresponds to the case 
where the variable is assigned a 1. The bottom (square) terminal-nodes of the tree 
represent the Boolean constants 0 and 1. Hence, the value of any Boolean function 
may be evaluated for any given number of variables by starting at the root (top) of the 
tree and following the path at each node, as determined from the value of the variable 
that the node represents. This process is repeated until a terminal-node (bottom) is 
reached. The value of the Boolean function, either a 0 or a 1, is represented by the 
value of the terminal node. 
A difficulty with representing Boolean functions with decision trees is that if the func-
tion contains a large number of variables, then the decision tree representing that 
function will also be very large. Figure 6, for example, represents the binary decision 
tree for the function f(x; y; z) = (x ∨ y ∨ z). A comparison of Figure 5, which repre-
sents a Boolean function with two variables, x and y, with Figure 6, which represents 
a Boolean function with three variables, x, y, and z, illustrates that there is an expo-
nential relationship between the number of variables in a the function and the number 
of nodes in the decision tree which represents that function. With increasing numbers 
of variables, therefore, the size of the decision trees used to represent functions in-
creases exponentially. As can be expected, the decision trees of complex Boolean 
functions can quickly become very large and difficult to use. 
 
Figure 5:  Binary decision diagram for the function f(x; y) = (x ∨ y) 
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Figure 6:  Binary decision diagram for the function f(x; y; z) = (x ∨ y ∨ z). 
3.6 Reduced Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (ROBDDs) 
In 1986, Randal Bryant proposed a solution to this problem in (Bryant 1986) by intro-
ducing algorithms for reducing binary trees and ordering the variables in a function. 
The process of reduction consists of merging any isomorphic sub-graphs for the deci-
sion tree. Any parent node which has child-nodes that are isomorphic is considered 
redundant and is removed. Applying this process to the decision tree for the Boolean 
function f(x; y) = (x ∨ y), as illustrated in Figure 7, it is evident that if the first node, 
x, is 1, then the value of the second node, y, has no effect on the terminal node value 
of the Boolean function: whether y is 0 or 1, the value of the terminal nodes is 1. This 
means that the where node x is 1, child-nodes of y are isomorphic. Node y can then be 
considered redundant here and removed. The result is the reduced decision tree illus-
trated in Figure 7. Similarly, applying the reduction process to the decision tree for 
the Boolean function f(x; y; z) = (x ∨ y ∨ z), illustrated in Figure 7, yields the reduced 
decision tree shown in Figure 8. Reduced decision trees allow a much more compact 
representation of Boolean expressions than non-reduced decision trees. 
Bryant also highlighted that the size of a decision tree for a given function is depend-
ent on the ordering of the variables in that decision tree. For example, the decision 
tree for the Boolean function f(w; x; y; z) = (w ∧ x) ∨ (y ∧ z), given a variable order-
ing of w; x; y; z, is illustrated on the left-hand diagram in Figure 8. 
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Figure 6:  Reduced Binary Decision Diagram for the function f(x; y) = (x ∨ y). 
 
Figure 7:  Reduced Binary Decision Diagram for the function f(x; y; z) = (x ∨ 
y ∨ z) 
 
Figure 8: Reduced Binary Decision Diagram for the function f(w; x; y; z) = 
(w ∧ x) ∨ (y ∧ z) with variable ordering of w; z; y; x. 
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If the variable ordering for the same function was now changed to w; z; y; x, the re-
sultant decision tree will be more complicated, as illustrated in the right hand side of 
Figure 8. Hence, an optimal variable ordering will produce the simplest, and therefore 
smallest, decision tree for a given function, while sub-optimal orderings will produce 
larger and more complex decision trees for the same function. However, as shown by 
Bollig and Wegener (Bollig and Wegener1996) ], determining the optimal variable 
ordering for a Boolean function is an NP-complete problem that often requires trial 
and error or expert knowledge of domain-specific ordering strategies.  
Decision trees which have been reduced and ordered are referred to as Reduced Or-
dered Binary Decision Diagrams (ROBDDs), or commonly shortened to just Binary 
Decision Diagrams (BDDs). A key property of the reduction and ordering restrictions 
introduced by Bryant is that the resulting BDDs are canonical (Bryant 1992). This 
means that the BDD for any Boolean function, for a defined variable ordering, will 
always be isomorphic. This property has made BDDs ideal for use in formal equiva-
lence checking. In the electronic design automation process, for example, BDDs are 
frequently used to formally prove that two circuit design representations exhibit the 
same behaviour.  
3.7 BDDs in Policy Modelling 
A novelty of this proposal is to exploit the unique properties of Binary Decision Dia-
grams (BDD) to model complex sets of policies, in a form that is readily machine-
executable, and to extend these to the information-sharing domain. The work of Ha-
zelhurst et al. (1998) with firewalls identified key constituent fields in access-list rules 
and translated these into bit vectors representing BDD variables. This research applies 
a similar methodology to information-sharing where a set of information-sharing 
policies can be modelled as a decision diagram, once a specific variable ordering 
scheme has been selected. The modelling of a set of policies as a BDD provides a 
number of significant advantages, including providing an efficient lookup mechanism 
for an information-sharing request as well as providing a graphical representation of 
the overall policy set. As rule sets become larger and more complex, they become 
difficult to interpret and maintain (Hazelhurst 2000). Modification of the rule set, by 
either adding new rules or removing existing ones, or even changing the order of rules 
has a significant impact on the behaviour of the policy-based system. As noted above 
this is a key requirement for modelling rapidly changing legal environments Hence, 
analysis and validation of large, complex rule sets is essential in ensuring that high-
level directives are enforced. 
3.8 Domain Modelling using BDDs 
The core of the patent is the linkage with the trust framework and the governance 
rules. In order to simply the access to data from domains, the method exposes only 
well-managed services to define the trust relationship. Within this the model defines a 
number of modelling elements, including: 
23 
 
 Permission. This is a simple permit or deny for access to a service. 
 Domain. This relates to the domain that an accessor is contained within, and 
is used to create the holder to the domain ontology. 
 Organisation. This relates to an organisation with a given domain. 
 Unit. This relates to a unit with an organisation. 
 Role. This defines the role that an accessor has in access a service within an-
other domain. 
 Relationship. This defines the relationship that the accessor has to the data 
being accessed. 
 Action. This defines a CRUD (Create, Read, Update or Delete) access to a 
service and its associated data. 
 Attribute. This defines an attribute of the object to be access, such as for a 
health record. 
 Object. This defines the actual access target, such as for a specific person. 
 Context. This defines the content of the investigation (which can be used to 
define certain risk levels for access privilege escalation. 
 Compliance. This defines the audit/compliance reasons for the access. 
The trust framework then defines the usage of each of these fields, and rules are writ-
ten which implements them. A sample rule is thus: 
[Permit] [Police.Police_Force_A.*.Sergeant] with [*] relationship [R] 
[Unique_Identifier] of [Child] with [Abuse_Investigation] context from [So-
cial_Care.Child_Protection_Agency_B.Records_Unit.Records_Admin] with Compli-
ance [Human_Rights_Act_1998] 
Overall the BDD model uses a binary representation for each of these fields, and 
which builds-up a rule definition with the binary representation of each of the possi-
bilities for the fields. For example if there are four roles, we can represent them with: 
 00 – Constable 
 01 – Sargent 
 10 –Superintendent 
 11 – Chief Superintendent 
These rules then use the BDD to determine if there are issues within in the govern-
ance rules related to: 
 Redundancy. This is where one set of rules is already included within the trust 
rules already defined.  
 Shadowing. This is where a rule is higher up in the set of rules, and matches all 
the conditions that match in the current rule, such that the shadowed rule will 
never be activated. 
 Generalisation. With this a rule is generalisation of another preceding rule if it 
matches all the packets of the preceding rule.  
 Correlation. Two rules are correlated if the first rule in order matches some of 
the fields of the condition of the second rule and the second rule matches some of 
the fields of the condition of the first rule. 
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The team have mapped out the modelling of these and have submitted a patent on the 
basis of this, and now require to scale-up the implementation to cope with real-life 
trust relationship. Full details at contained in the patent application [16]. 
3.9 Simple Example 
We can now develop further the example discussed previously in 3, a request for 
highly sensitive data in a child protection case. This example describes in detail the 
steps needed to translate a set of information-sharing policies to a BDD. List 1 shows 
a sample list of policies. A ‘*’ or ‘Any’ is used to denote redundant fields, or redun-
dant portions of fields. Redundant fields are not translated into binary as they repre-
sent variables that are not evaluated by the BDD and, hence, do not form part of the 
Boolean function. Where an entire field is redundant, it is entirely excluded from the 
binary representation and where only a portion of a field is redundant, only the rele-
vant portion is translated while the redundant portions are shown using ‘Xs’. 
Listing 1: 
Policy 1: This policy <permits> <ANY> requester, with <ANY> relation in <ANY> 
context, to request to <read> a <child’s> <Health History Record> from the <Records 
Admin> of the <Records Unit> of <Child Protection Agency ‘B’> under compliance 
of the <Data Protection Act> 
 
Policy 1: 
Compliance (DPA)      : 1 
Requester (Any)      : not checked by BDD 
Relation (Any)      : not checked by BDD 
Context (Any)      : not checked by BDD 
Object (Child)      : 1 
Attribute (Health History Record)   : 01 
Owner (SocCare.CPA-B.RecUnit.RecAdmin) : SocCare : 10  
          : CPA-B: 10 
       : RecUnit : 10 
       : RecAdmin : 10 
Action (Permit)      : 1 
 
The Boolean function corresponding to Policy1, ignoring redundant fields, is a logical 
conjunction of all of the above fields in the format shown in Listing 2. Listing 2 rep-
resents Policy1 expressed logically as an ‘if-then’ conditional statement. 
Listing 2: 
Permit: Compliance ^ Owner ^ Object ^ Attribute 
 
Listing 3: Rule1 expressed as an if-then conditional statement. 
if  (Compliance = 1) ^ 
(Owner = 10101010) ^ 
(Object = 1) ^ 
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(Attribute = 01), 
then (Action = Permit) 
4 Conclusions 
This paper tried to bring computer science and socio-legal theory into a dialogue. We 
began by a socio-legal analysis of the problem government agencies in the UK face 
when trying to reconcile data protection rules with overarching data sharing require-
ments. We used in particular the influential study by Perri, Bellamy and Raab to de-
velop a conceptual understanding of the nature of the tension. Form this we gained a 
number of key distinction: Vertical, domain specific approaches to manage the ten-
sion between privacy and data sharing can be distinguished from horizontal, or global 
approaches. Situations where the citizen volunteers data for his own benefit can be 
distinguished from situations where the data acquisition and data sharing is in the 
public good, with only indirect benefits for the individual. These different categories 
result in praxis in a plethora of different approaches and legal frameworks to manage 
data protection while ensuring efficient delivery of government services.  
PBR conclude that in the majority of cases, this can result in marginalising privacy 
interest, contradicting the stated ideal of privacy and efficient service deliver reinforc-
ing each other. The question our paper asked of the computer scientists then became a 
quest for formal approaches to privacy compliant data sharing that “squares the cir-
cle” and resolves, to the extent that this is possible, the apparent conflict between the 
two.  
A key concept that emerged as part of both our empirical work with key stakeholders 
in pubic secretor agencies and through the literature was the notion of “trust”: only if I 
can trust that my data tis sufficiently  protected by robust privacy policies will I vol-
unteer it as a citizen, only if I can trust the partner agency to use the information to 
they get from me as far as possible in a way that protects the privacy of my clients 
and sources, and acknowledges my professional understanding of my role and the 
integrity if my work will I be willing to share my data with them. Data Protection 
preserving ICT data sharing infrastructures and trust preserving ICT infrastructures 
therefore go hand in hand.  
In Section 3 of this paper, we put these ideas into practice, by developing an infor-
mation sharing syntax that directly embeds key ideas form data protection law into the 
data exchange protocols between agencies. By being privacy compliant by design, 
this approach should foster trust between agencies with vastly different professional 
attitudes and self-understandings – differences that as PBR have shown also influence 
the way they think about privacy. By allowing them to formulate their respective 
roles, concepts and understandings, and by providing an abstract formal concept of 
“criminal investigation context”, we mimicked the balancing act between privacy and 
public interest prescribed by law, while acknowledging local differences and differ-
ences in professional attitudes. 
The same concept of choice, consent and determination over one’s data was then used 
in the final part of this part, where we abstracted further from the specific situation of 
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individual agencies in a specific data sharing context, to a more abstract generalised 
approach that preserves privacy in cross-agency sharing through the proxy of “trust” – 
I trust only those partners with information I holed where the abstraction of the rele-
vant privacy and data protection rules gives me reason to trust them. The exchange 
between legal and political theory and informatics that this paper attempted then 
shows at the very least how on the conceptual level, the issue raised by Perri, Bellamy 
and Raab can be answered through a computational, trust enhancing and privacy 
compliant information sharing infrastructure. For the computer scientists, this means 
that the alignment of their thinking with key socio-legal concepts gives us good rea-
sons to believe that an approach that so far has been developed for and tried in a hos-
pital setting only, can indeed be a seen as a model for privacy compliant data ex-
change across government departments in general .  
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